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Abstract: Elements of regulation inherent in most social health insurance systems are a uniform 
package of benefits and uniform cost sharing. Both elements risk to burden the population with a 
welfare loss if preferences differ. This suggests introducing more contracted choice; however, it 
is widely believed that this would not benefit the aged. This study examines the relationship 
between age and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for additional options in Swiss social health 
insurance. Through discrete choice experiments (DCE), a marked diversity of preferences can be 
established. The findings suggest that while the aged do exhibit more status quo bias, they require 
less rather than more specific compensation for selected cutbacks considered, pointing to 
potential for contracts that induce self-rationing in return for lower premiums. 
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1 Introduction 
Healthcare systems based on mandatory health insurance face a difficult trade-off. On the one 
hand, they seek to prevent free-riding on society's basic consensus that no-one shall be left 
suffering from disease for lack of financial means to pay for health care. This calls for a benefit 
package and a degree of coverage that all insurance policies must offer. On the other hand, if 
there is diversity of preferences, these minimum requirements cause a welfare loss, which 
increases as the basic benefit package grows more comprehensive, causing insurance premiums 
to rise (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1997 and 2000; Pauly, 1992 and 1994). Policy makers therefore 
are led to ask the question on whether further additions to the list of benefits are warranted and 
conversely, on what terms restricting benefits or the degree of coverage would be accepted. 
However, they often are confronted with the argument that broad segments of the population, in 
particular the aged, would not benefit from these enlarged choices at all. One general observation 
with respect to choice behavior – not only in the field of health insurance choice – is that with 
increasing age, individuals are less likely to change to alternatives, preferring to stay with the 
status quo that is familiar to them (Schwarze and Andersen, 2002; Royalty and Solomon, 1999). 
This status quo bias might be especially pronounced for decisions with regard to health insurance, 
since a future spell of illness may reveal that the alternative contract contains features making it 
an inferior choice. 
The present paper purports to address these issues using evidence on willingness-to-pay (WTP) 
for proposed changes in Swiss social health insurance. Switzerland is a case of interest because 
its health insurance combines mandatory with choice elements in a way that is similar to other 
countries, notably the United States and the Netherlands (OECD, 2004). By the Health Insurance 
Law (KVG), effective since 1996, all permanent residents are obliged to purchase health 
insurance policies for basic coverage. The law also defines a uniform basic package of healthcare 
benefits, whose importance has increased tremendously over the years, mostly driven by 
technological progress and new treatment methods. Criteria for a therapy or a new 
pharmaceutical product to be included in the basic package are medical effectiveness, 
expedience, and economic efficiency (Art. 32 KVG). The Federal Agency for Health is in charge 
of a regular re-evaluation of the treatments covered in the light of medical, economic, 
epidemiologic, and demographic developments. These reviews are designed to uncover potential 
for rationalization by allowing new treatments to replace old, less cost-effective ones. However, 
experience has shown that it is difficult to include innovations in the basic benefit package 
without raising insurance premiums. 
At the same time, there are several elements of choice. First, residents can individually select one 
of some 100 health insurers, with no involvement of the employer at all. In turn, insurers by law 
must accept any applicant. The fact that premiums are uniform for adults in a given region and 
hence independent of age facilitates this type of choice for all age groups. 
The second element of choice relates to the type of policy. Within the set of conventional 
policies, the Swiss can choose between different levels of annual deductibles, with a minimum of 
CHF 300 (CHF 230 until 2004, 1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2007 exchange rates) and a maximum of CHF 
1,500. In addition, there are Managed Care alternatives, offered by some of the major insurers. 
They include physician networks (similar to Independent Provider Associations in the United 
States), restricted lists of physicians (Preferred Provider Organizations) and Health Maintenance 
Organizations (HMO). However, the basic package of benefits remains the same, independent of 
the deductible and model chosen. 
Against this backdrop, this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents four hypotheses 
regarding the demand for health insurance and age that can be derived from different strands of 
economic theory. One of them indeed predicts a positive relationship; should it be confirmed, any 
cutback in coverage would be likely to hurt the elderly more than proportionally. Section 3 
introduces the method of discrete choice experiments (DCE) as a tool for measuring WTP for a 
non-existing product, in the present case for additional options in health insurance. In section 4, 
information on the study population and the setup of the survey conducted in Switzerland is 
given. Section 5 contains descriptive statistics and estimation results. WTP both for selected 
variations of the basic benefit package and the degree of coverage are derived and compared 
across age groups in an attempt to discriminate between the three hypotheses. This calls for 
accounting for heterogeneity in preferences; indeed, section 6 contains evidence suggesting that 
the aged do exhibit a stronger status quo bias than the rest of the population. However, once they 
are compensated for a change of contract in the first place,  the aged actually may be won over 
more easily for accepting cutbacks in the comprehensiveness of health insurance coverage. 
Section 7 concludes. 
2 Age and the Demand for Health Insurance 
This section is devoted to developing competing hypotheses regarding the relationship between 
age and the demand for health insurance. 
The first hypothesis concerns preference for the status quo. Collecting the information for a 
choice constitutes an investment. With increasing age, the expected utility payoff from having 
found a preferred alternative necessarily decreases (unless the investment has the effect of 
increasing remaining life expectancy, a complication that is neglected here). Therefore, one has 
H1: Due to a reduced expected payoff period to the investment incurred for evaluating an 
alternative to the status quo, status quo bias is predicted to increase with age.  
A standard result in insurance theory is that WTP for insurance depends on the product of asset 
variance and the coefficient of absolute risk aversion (Arrow, 1971). Now with increasing age, 
not only average healthcare expenditure (HCE) may increase but its variance as well. There is 
evidence of increased variance from studies on the so-called costs of dying (Lubitz and Riley, 
1993; Zweifel et al., 1999; Felder et al., 2000; Seshamani and Gray, 2004). They find that 
HCEincurred during the last year of life is at least seven times higher than for individuals who 
continue to live. However, the likelihood of being in one's last year of life increases with age, and 
with it the variance of HCE and of assets prior to insurance, and hence WTP for health insurance. 
With regard to absolute risk aversion, there is no compelling theoretical argument suggesting a 
systematic relationship with age, and the empirical evidence is inconclusive (Bellante and Green, 
2004; Halek and Eisenhower, 2001; Riley and Chow, 1992). This component can thus be 
disregarded, leading to a second hypothesis, 
H2: Due to increased asset variance caused by health problems, demand for health 
insurance is predicted to increase with age, ceteris paribus. 
A third hypothesis can be derived by noting that the demand for insurance may also depend 
positively on the value of the asset at risk, especially if the size of the possible loss increases with 
the value of the asset (Arrow, 1971; Mossin, 1968). Considering health (rather than wealth) to be 
the asset at risk, the fact that this asset can be lost entirely because of death makes a positive 
relationship between the asset and the size of the loss credible. Now health insurance can be seen 
as indirectly insuring health to the extent that it grants access to effective medical care. WTP for 
it should therefore follow the value of life over the life cycle. 
The value of life depends on discounted future labor earnings and on discounted future gross 
consumer surplus of being alive with a certain rate of consumption (Shepard and Zeckhauser, 
1984; Felder, 1997). After the completion of education, labor earnings increase, causing the value 
of life to rise. Setting the earnings peak somewhere between age 40 and retirement seems 
intuitive. After the earnings peak, WTP for extending life decreases since the impact of a 
shrinking residual life expectancy becomes dominant. According to the argument expounded in 
the previous paragraph, WTP for health insurance should follow a similar pattern. Beyond age 
40-62 (say), it is predicted to decrease with age, contrary to the second hypothesis. 
H3: In view of the declining value of health itself, demand for health insurance is predicted 
to decline beyond age 40 or higher. 
A fourth hypothesis combines the arguments of hypotheses H2 and H3 , focusing on retirement 
status. There are reasons to believe that the price elasticity of the demand for medical care 
decreases with age (Schut et al., 2003; Strombom et al., 2002). This parameter depends on the 
elasticity of substitution between medical inputs and own effort in the production of health. 
Given that the relative productivity of an individual's own effort is likely to decrease with age, 
the elasticity of substitution decreases as well. However, it should locally increase after 
retirement because the reduction of working time serves to relax the time constraint. Facing a less 
restrictive time constraint, retirees can lower the variance in their health asset by undertaking 
preventive measures like exercising and improved nutrition. Therefore, a temporary decrease of 
the variance in the health asset is predicted. At the same time, its value decreases according to H3 
because expected future labor income falls. Both effects induce the demand for health insurance 
to decrease with retirement. 
H4: Transition to retirement leads to a temporary reduction both in the variance and value 
of the health asset. This causes the demand for coverage for health insurance to decrease. 
The objective of the present work is to test these four hypotheses. 
Now a change of health insurance by assumption occurs only if this promises an increase in 
utility at least on expectation. In the present context however, most alternatives presented are not 
available (yet), and actual choices thus cannot be observed. This means that in order to predict 
choices, the utility associated with alternatives must be estimated. When it comes to replacing 
revealed preference by stated preference, two main approaches are available. The traditional one 
is contingent valuation (for a survey, see Mitchell and Carson (1989)) . In an experiment, all the 
attributes of the alternative are held constant across scenarios except price, and participants are 
asked to state the maximum price that still keeps the alternative preferable. Among the stated 
preference approaches, so called discrete choice experiments (DCE) constitute a very powerful 
instrument to quantify the willingness-to-pay (WTP) indirectly by choice experiments, rather 
than asking directly for an acceptable price. The flexible way of designing a realistic contract 
choice scenario with various influencing attributes allows making predictions as to how WTP for 
more comprehensive health insurance (or conversely, compensation required for accepting 
contracts with cutbacks) vary with age. Depending on the confirmed hypothesis, compensation 
required for cutbacks increases (H2) or decreases (H3, H4) with age, implying that a widened 
contractual choice may be of little or no value (H2) or substantial value (H3, H4) to the older 
population. 
3 Discrete Choice Experiments 
Based on random utility theory (Luce, 1959; Manski, 1977; McFadden, 1974, 1981 and 2001), 
discrete choice experiments (DCE) are designed to allow individuals to express their preferences 
for non-marketed goods or goods which do not yet exist. Applications of DCE to the valuation of 
healthcare programs have become more numerous over the past years (see Ryan and Gerard, 
2003 for an overview; Scanlon et al., 1997). In a DCE individuals are given a hypothetical choice 
between many or just two (binary choice) commodities. From the trade-offs respondents 
implicitly make between the different attributes of the product, the researcher can infer the utility 
associated with product attributes. The inclusion of a cost or price attribute permits estimating the 
value of the remaining product attributes in money terms. Biases that might occur when 
individuals are asked about their WTP directly (as in Contingent Valuation) are less likely to be 
observed (Ryan, 2004). 
The first step of a DCE involves the definition of the attributes of the commodity and the levels 
assigned to them (Louvière et al., 2000; Ryan and Gerard, 2003). In the present case of Swiss 
health insurance, attributes that currently are in the political debate were chosen to describe the 
different benefit packages (for more details see Table 1). These attributes had been checked in a 
pretest for their relevance, occasioning some adjustments to the deductible attribute, whose range 
had to be decreased to avoid protest responses for lack of realism.1 The retained attributes are 
                                                 
1 For potential difficulties with the inclusion of cost variables see Slothuus-Skjoldborg and Gyrd-Hansen (2003). 
• variation in the annual deductible; 
• variation in the  levels of copayment; 
• variation in coverage of treatment methods in alternative medicine; 
• variation in the drug benefit; 
• variation in the speed of access to innovative treatments; 
• variation in the premium as a result of these extensions or limitations of benefits (this 
constitutes the price attribute). 
Table 1 
Product attributes and levels in the main survey 
Attribute Label Levels  
Deductible deduct - Status quo: CHF 230, 400, 600, 1’200, 1’500per year 
- CHF 0, 2’400, 4’800 per year 
 
Copayment copay - Status quo: 10% (=0) with a maximum of CHF 600 
- 20% (=1) with a maximum of CHF 1’200 
 
Alternative medicine altmed - Status quo: some treatment methods are covered (=0) 
- More alternative treatment methods are covered (=1) 
 
Medication generics - Status quo: all drugs on the list are reimbursed (=0) 
- The cheapest product on the market is reimbursed (=1) 
 
Access to innovation innovation - Status quo: all treatment methods are covered as soon as they get approval (=0) 
- Innovative treatment methods are covered only three years after introduction (=1) 
 
Premium premium - Increase of the monthly premium by CHF 50, 25 or 10 
- Decrease of the monthly premium by CHF 50, 25 or 10 
 
Coding of dummy variables in parentheses.  
 
These six attributes and their levels including the status quo levels combine for a very large 
number of choice sets. Using statistical design optimization procedures (Kuhfeld et al., 1994; 
Hardin and Sloane, 1993 and 1994), their number was reduced to 27 and randomly split in three 
groups. One choice was included twice in each choice set for consistency checking (Ryan and 
Bate, 2001), resulting in 10 choices per person. Each of the 10 alternatives had to be evaluated 
against the status quo insurance contract. 
As a rational subject, a respondent is predicted to always choose the alternative with the higher 
level of utility. The decision making process within a DCE can thus be seen as a comparison of 
utility values ijV , 
)1(),,,( , ijiijjiij sypavV ε=  
where ijv  represents the indirect utility function of individual i  for an insurance contract with a 
vector of attributes ja  and a price denoted by jp . The income of individual i  is iy , the 
sociodemographic characteristics are denoted by is , and the error term by ijε . 
With an additive error term, the individual will choose contract j  rather than contract l  if  
)2(),,(),,,( iliilliijiijji sypawsypaw εε +≥+  
Here, )(⋅iw  is the deterministic component of the utility that can be estimated, while the error 
terms reflect unobservable factors that vary with the individual and the alternatives. The utility 
function )(⋅iw  can be inferred from observed choices by assuming that the probability ijP  of 
choosing alternative j  rather than l , given the vector of attributes, equals the probability of the 
difference in utilities given in (2) occurring. Therefore,  
)3(]),,(),,,(Pr[ iliilliijiijjiij sypawsypawP εε +≥+=  
Rearranging this inequality into a stochastic and a deterministic part leads to the following 
expression, 
)4(,...)]a(w,...)a(w)εεPr[(P jiliilijij −≥−=  
This condition makes intuitive sense because it states that the noise on the left-hand side must be 
dominated by the systematic utility difference on the right-hand side for inference with regard to 
the determinants of choice to be possible. Moreover the utility function is usually assumed to be 
linear2, 
)5(...2211 ijii aacv εββ ++++=  
where ic  is a constant, Kββ ,...1  are the parameters to be estimated, and Kaa ,...1  (K = 6 in the 
present case) are the different attributes of the commodity. The parameters Kββ ,...1  can be 
interpreted as the marginal utilities of the attributes; they are constant in the case of a linear utility 
function. This rather strong assumption might not be satisfied for attributes covering a wide range 
such as the deductible or the premium. To test for nonlinearity, quadratic terms of regressors 
                                                 
2 There is empirical evidence that a linear specification leads to good predictions in the middle ranges of the utility 
function (Hensher et al., 1999). 
exhibiting a good deal of variation (deductible, premium) are included in the empirical 
specification. In particular, 2premium  is used to indicate whether the marginal utility of income 
is constant or decreasing (see below), while a negative coefficient of 2deductible  points to risk 
aversion. The marginal rate of substitution between two attributes k  and m  is given by 
)6(,
/
/
,
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mk av
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with the marginal utilities taken from the estimated utility function. 
The WTP for a specific attribute can be calculated by dividing the respective slope parameter of 
the indirect utility function by the parameter pertaining to the price variable (in the present case 
the monthly premium, reflecting the marginal utility of income3). This ratio then indicates how 
much income respondents are willing to forego in order to obtain an increased amount of the 
other attribute.  
The dependent variable being either 0 (opt for status quo) or 1 (opt for alternative), logit or probit 
techniques are appropriate, depending on the assumption being made on the distribution of the 
error terms. Since respondents have to make several choices, the underlying data has a panel 
structure, suggesting a random-effects specification (for a more detailed explanation of DCE, see 
Louvière et al., 2000 and Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). Limiting the specification to the product 
attributes, one obtains the following expression representing the difference in utility between 
status quo and alternative insurance contract, 
ijpremiumβinnovationβ
)7(genericsβaltmedβcopaymentβdeductβdeductβcijV∆
7
54
2
6
3210
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3 This can be shown by Roy's Identity. Quantity demanded equals the negative ratio of partial derivatives of the 
indirect utility function with respect to price and income, 
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. Thus the marginal 
utility of income is equals the negative derivative of the indirect utility function with respect to price. 
where ilij ij εεϕ −=  and oloj ccc −=0 . At this point, squared premium ( 2premium ) is already 
excluded because of lack of statistical significance, pointing to constancy of the marginal utility 
of income.  
According to the random utility model, individuals thus evaluate the difference between the 
status quo and the  alternative presented. For the dummy variables representing copayment, 
alternative medicine, generics, and innovation, this does not require any adjustments of the 
variables entering the estimation function. The premium variable is defined as the absolute 
change in Swiss Francs (CHF) from the actual contract; it takes on six discrete values (see Table 
1 again). For the deductible, the difference between the level proposed in the alternative contract 
and the one in the status quo contract needs to be taken. 
The ijϕ  are assumed to be normally distributed and to have a random component structure4 such 
that  
)8(ijiij ηµϕ +=  
where iµ  is a stochastic component, varying only with the individual but not across choices. The 
iµ  and ijη  are uncorrelated with the vector of attributes ),...,( 1 iKi aa . In the probit model, iµ  and 
ijη  are assumed to be ),0( σNiid ∼ , with 1=ησ  as the standard assumption so that  
)9(1][ 222 µµη σσσϕ +=+=ijVar  
and  
[ ] )10(
1
, 2
2
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σ
σρϕϕ +==ilijCorr . 
Evidently, ρ  indicates how strongly the different choices j  and l  of a given individual are 
correlated over the course of the experiment (Greene, 2000, Ch. 19.5). A high and significant 
value of ρ  indicates that the random-effects specification is justified. Another advantage of the 
                                                 
4 The alternative would be to estimate a fixed-effects model. This would necessitate the estimation of individual-
specific constants, increasing the number of dummy variables tremendously and thus causing multicollinearity 
problems. This would preclude estimation of age and other socioeconomic effects, which are at the focus of this 
study. 
probit model is that it relaxes the strong IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) assumption 
of the logit model (Train, 2003; Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). 
Marginal utilities and WTP values can be made to depend on socioeconomic characteristics by 
extending the model of equation (7). Since the age-related effects are the main focus of this work, 
the three variables for age groups (a2539, a40-62, a63+) serve as an example. They are 
interacted with the product attributes as well as the constant (which gives rise to their direct 
inclusion, permitting status quo bias to vary between groups),  
ijaadeducta
deductadeductapremiumdeductcVij
ϕβββ
ββββ
+++++∗++
∗+∗+++++=∆
++ ...632539...63...
)11(25392539....
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where as before ilij ij εεϕ −=  and oloj ccc −=0 . The comprehensive specification shown in the 
appendix includes additional interaction terms involving socioeconomic characteristics such as 
sex, income, household size, language (French, German), and subjective health status. Moreover, 
current premium paid serves as an indicator of the basic tendency to change in search of a less 
costly alternative.  
4 Sample and Setup of the Study 
To find out about the preferences of the Swiss residential population concerning their health 
insurance, a representative telephone survey with 1,000 persons aged over 25 living in the 
German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland was conducted. The survey, fielded in 
September 2003, was in two steps. In a first telephone contact, individuals who agreed to 
participate were asked to look up their personal monthly premium and annual deductible for the 
compulsory part of their insurance policy. Knowledge about the status quo is essential for 
respondents to be able to make an informed choice between their current contract and a proposed 
alternative. They also were sent a package of information material to make sure that all had the 
same information concerning services covered by the uniform compulsory part of their policy, 
enabling them to assess the variations considered in the experiment.5 
The second telephone contact was by appointment and consisted of the questionnaire itself. It 
started with questions concerning utilization of healthcare services, overall satisfaction with the 
healthcare system, insurer and insurance policy, and a general preference for new elements in the 
                                                 
5 See San Miguel et al. (2005) for the importance of a priori information for choice consistency in a DCE. 
insurance package. Socioeconomic variables surveyed were age, sex, education, total household 
income, education (seven categories ranging from primary school to university degree), place of 
residence, occupation, and marital status. 
The DCE was implemented in the second part of the survey. Participants were asked to compare 
the status quo, i.e. their current insurance contract, with 10 hypothetical alternatives defined by 
the six attributes named in section 3. To mitigate learning or fatigue effects, the order of the 
choice alternatives was randomly changed (Merino-Castellò, 2003; Kjaer et al, 2006). 
5 Descriptive Results 
5.1 Socioeconomic characteristics 
The sample consists of 780 respondents from the German-speaking part of Switzerland and 220 
of the French-speaking population. Half the sample are women, the other half, men. The sample 
was weighted by language regions, resulting in an average age of 49 years. No less than 46 
percent of the persons interviewed stated very high interest in health-related issues, with a still 
higher share among those aged over 65 years. This might reflect a selection effect because people 
interested in health issues were more likely to participate. 
Some 80 percent of the respondents stated that they currently were in very good or good health. 
This corresponds rather closely to the results of the survey Healthmonitor 2001 (Longchamps, 
2001). As to medical services, 28 percent of the sample had not used any medical care during the 
past 6 months, 12 percent had been in hospital, 50 percent had received outpatient care, 21 
percent had seen a dentist, 10 percent had consulted a healer, and 39 percent had taken 
medications. Again, these frequencies accord with the results of the survey Healthmonitor 2001. 
Other key variables are in line with official statistics, too. 
On average, the interviewed paid a monthly premium of CHF 240 (US$ 192) for their mandatory 
health insurance. This average is lower than the CHF 270 (US$ 216) computed for the whole of 
Switzerland by the Federal Agency for Social Insurance (2003). This difference can be explained 
by three factors. First, the official figure includes only the (expensive) contracts with the lowest 
deductible, whereas the sample also includes (less expensive) contracts with higher deductibles 
and Managed Care alternatives. Second, the canton Tessin (Ticino, Italian-speaking), a canton 
with traditionally high HCEand high premiums, was not sampled for this study. Third, the official 
figure includes the contributions to accident insurance, which were excluded here. 
The frequencies of the different annual deductibles are shown in Table 2. With 24.8 percent, the 
highest deductible of CHF 1,500 (US$ 1,200) is over-represented. According to official statistics 
for 2001, only 9 percent chose the highest level. However, this share was still lower in 1999 (5.4 
percent; Federal Agency for Health, 2006). Therefore, there is a tendency towards higher 
deductibles, which may go some way towards bridging the gap between the sample and the 
general population as of 2003. The gap may still reflect the possibility that people who are 
willing to take part in a health-related survey are more informed about the different options that 
result in premium reductions. However, the over-representation of the maximum deductible may 
also be the result of risk selection. Indeed, the sample has a modal age of 35, an age group with a 
rather good health status. 
Table 2 
Frequencies of deductible levels in Swiss health insurance (in percent)  
2005b) 
Annual deductible in CHF  1999a) 2003 Survey (2003) (N=1000) 
Deductible In percent 
230 47.6  41.8  36.1  300 43 
400 30.8 22.1 22.4 500 24.1 
600 7.6 10.2 14.3 1’000 2.8 
1’200 3.2 2.6 2.4 1’500 15.0 
1’500 3.9 15.0 24.8 2’000 0.8 
Other c) 7.0 8.3 0.8 2’500 4.4 
a) Second year after introduction of the new Health Insurance Law with a minimum deductible of  CHF 230. 
b) New deductibles effective from 2005. 
c) Insured in Managed-Care or Bonus-Option contracts. 
1 CHF = 0.8 US$ at 2007 exchange rates; Source: Federal Agency for Health (2006). 
 
For a preliminary investigation into the relationship between age and the demand for more 
flexibility in health insurance, the data set is split into the age groups 25 to 39 years, 40 to 62, and 
63+, respectively. The first two groupings are in accordance with the development of the value of 
life (see H3 in section 2). As to the retirement effect of H4, the official retirement age in 
Switzerland is 65 for men and 64 (63 if born before 1942) for women. However, the information 
about professional status (marker “retiree”) suggests that some individuals have retired earlier. 
By letting the highest age group start at 63, one has almost all retirees in that group.6 
5.2 Analysis of choice behavior 
A first indicator of the importance of choice is the change of insurer over the past five years. Of 
the entire sample, 77 percent did not change their insurer, 20 percent changed once, and 2 percent 
changed more than once. Among those 63 years and older, only 13 percent (rather than the 
average of 20 percent) stated one change of insurer. This observation leads to the presumption 
that older people benefit less from choice concerning health insurance, although they state a 
higher interest in health-related issues. 
A second indicator is the change of the type of insurance that occurred over the past five years. 
Overall, 66 percent stayed with their old insurance contract. Among respondents younger than 
40, this figure drops to 58 percent. For the age group of 63 years and older, it rises to 78 percent. 
The elderly who decided to change opted for an individually chosen deductible (8 percent), 
followed by the preferred provider model (6 percent), or they changed back to a conventional 
contract (5 percent). 
A third indicator of flexibility can be derived from the global results of the DCE. A total of 
10,000 decisions could be made by the 1,000 individuals in the sample. 18 percent of these 
decisions were made in favor of the alternative, giving up the status quo contract. This figure, 
while low at the first sight, is around the expected percentage of a DCE with such a high degree 
of complexity (Telser et al., 2004). The question arises of whether these changes are concentrated 
among few individuals only. As can be seen from Table 3, around 40 percent of the respondents 
never chose the alternative insurance contract. Therefore, some 60 percent were flexible in that 
they deviated from their status quo at least once. This figure should not be taken as a predictor of 
actual choice behavior of the Swiss population, however. It is known that actual decision making 
is subject to considerable status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988). In the context of 
health insurance, this bias has been found to be especially marked among older persons (Schut et 
al., 2003; Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1997; Schwarze and Andersen, 2001). 
                                                 
6 Including a dummy variable for “retiree” in the estimation caused a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, the age 
segment 63+ was used as a proxy for retirement status. 
As to the consistency within the 10 choices of each individual, the alternative considered twice 
was “correctly” chosen by nearly all respondents, with the exception of 13 individuals out of 
1,000. While these choices remained included in the sample in order not to impose excessive 
consistency, inconsistency of choices does not seem to be an issue in this study.. The choices 
made were also plausible. Individuals were in general more likely to opt for the objectively 
“good” alternatives within the 10 choices and remain at their status quo for obviously “bad” 
alternatives. Individuals showing dominant preferences were not excluded from the estimation to 
avoid embellishing the sample. 
Table 3 
Choices of the alternative over the status quo  
Number of choices (of a total of 10) Frequency In percent 
0 387 38.7 
1 142 14.3 
2 142 14.3 
3 124 12.4 
4 112 11.2 
5 43 4.3 
6 21 2.1 
7 6 0.6 
8 3 0.3 
9 1 0.1 
10 3 0.3 
Total 985 98.5 
Missing 15 1.5 
Full sample n=1000 100 
 
6 Estimation Results 
6.1 Empirical relevance of the product attributes 
Equation (7) is the simple core model traditionally used for DCE in which marginal utilities and 
hence WTP values do not depend on socioeconomic characteristics. The random-effects probit 
estimation results in highly significant coefficients with the expected signs (Table 4). Therefore, 
it can be said that the six product attributes distinguished proved relevant for choice. However, 
the highly significant and large value of the constant points to marked status quo bias. 
Table 4      
Random-effects probit estimation results (simple model) 
 expected sign coefficient std.error z-value marg. effect 
constant 0 -0.76362** 0.05893 -12.96  
deductible - -0.00057** 0.00003 -18.64 -0.00007 
deductible2 +/- 3.80e-08** 7.88e-09 4.82 4.45e-09 
copayment - -0.27058** 0.04282 -6.32 -0.03201 
altmed a) + 0.35371** 0.04198 8.43 0.04265 
generics - -0.19710** 0.04211 -4.68 -0.02334 
innovation - -0.54942** 0.04807 -11.43 -0.06479 
premium - -0.01431** 0.00061 -23.63 -0.00171 
    σ=0.90224, ρ=0.44875 
Log likelihood: -3134.5289     
n=9569      
a) expanded coverage of alternative medicine (status quo= no inclusion) 
** (*) significant at the 1 (5) percent level 
 
 
A comparison is possible between constant, altmed, generics, innovation, and copayment since 
they are all (0,1)-variables. Among the contract attributes, having access to the latest innovations 
has the greatest effect on choice of contract (the negative of -0.549); however, it is not by itself 
sufficient to overcome status quo bias. For this, one would have to add an expanded catalogue of 
alternative treatment methods. The smallest (negative) effect on choice is associated with a 
contract that restricts the drug formulary to generics or the cheapest drug on the market. 
Mean marginal WTP values for the attributes can be derived from equations (6) and (7). 
Estimates are shown in Table 5, with standard errors calculated using the Delta method (STATA, 
2004). 
As could be expected, the mean individual of the survey needs to be compensated to overcome 
his or her status quo bias, i.e. to consider a change in the insurance contract in the first place. For 
this, a premium reduction of about 53 CHF per month (22 percent of average premium) would be 
necessary. An issue of great interest in the ongoing reform debate in Switzerland and Germany is 
the willingness to accept deductibles and copayments and the selection effects resulting from 
choosing different levels of deductibles (Schellhorn, 2001; Werblow and Felder, 2003). Ex-ante 
rational individuals would want to limit theirex-post moral hazard by opting for a positive rate of 
coinsurance (Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, Ch. 6).  
First, for a median individual with CHF 400 deductible at present, an increase in the annual 
deductible by CHF 1 has to be compensated with a monthly premium reduction of 3.47 cents (s.e. 
0.204 or smaller). An individual who has the highest deductible of CHF 1,500 today only needs 
to be compensated with 3.27 cents (s.e. 0.147 or smaller). This decrease is not compatible with 
the assumption of constant absolute risk aversion, pointing to the possibility that individuals with 
low risk aversion choose the contract with the highest deductible. Neglecting such variation in 
risk aversion, one can infer that the transition from a deductible of CHF 400 (compensation 3.47 
cents) to CHF 1,500 would have to be compensated by a reduction of roughly CHF 38 in the 
monthly premium. This compares favorably with the actual premium reduction, which amounts 
to CHF 65 as of 2003.7 
Second, there is an estimated WTP for avoiding a 20 percent rate of coinsurance (compared to 10 
percent at present) of CHF 19 (s.e. 3.3 or smaller). This figure cannot be juxtaposed directly to 
variations in actual premiums because the present rate is set uniformly at 10 percent. However, it 
amounts to about 8 percent of the sample average premium of CHF 240. Since a 10 percentage 
point increase in the rate of coinsurance necessarily reduces insurance payments by at least 10 
percent (HCE borne by the insured plus mitigation of moral hazard effects), health insurers on 
average should be able to offer premium reductions that overcome consumers’ resistance against 
cost sharing. 
 
                                                 
7 In spite of this favorable comparison, only 25 percent of respondents have the maximum deductible (see Table 3). 
Table 5 
Mean marginal WTP for attributes (in CHF per month) – derived from the simple model  
        WTP std. error (Delta-Method) 
constant (status quo bias) -53.36 ** 4.63 
deduct a) -0.04 ** 0.008 
copayment -18.91 ** 2.988 
altmed 24.71 ** 3.10 
generics -13.77 ** 3.06 
innovation -38.39 ** 3.32 
a) compensation in CHF required for a 1 CHF increase in the annual deductible for the median individual.  
** WTP significant at the 1 percent level. 
1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2007 exchange rates 
 
Concerning the list of benefits, the inclusion of the existing and some new treatments from 
alternative medicine commands a WTP of some CHF 25 (s.e. 3.10 or smaller). With CHF 14 (s.e. 
3.15 or smaller), WTP to avoid a drug benefit limited to generics is even lower. Put the other way 
around, WTP to have access to the latest pharmaceutical innovation is not very marked. This 
stands in stark contrast with the finding that for giving up immediate access to medical 
innovations, individuals would have to be compensated by CHF 38 (s.e. 3.36 or smaller) per 
month in terms of reduced premiums (see Table 6).  
6.2 Accounting for socioeconomic differences 
This section is devoted to the discussion of a comprehensive formulation of the probit equation 
that allows marginal utilities and WTP values to depend on socioeconomic characteristics, as 
introduced in section 3. Explanatory variables included in the model were age (in three 
categories), gender, language (German, French), monthly per capita income (in three categories), 
household size, the actual premium paid to control for premium differences in the different 
cantons, and a proxy for health status. Stated subjective health status proved to be insignificant, 
due to the high share of individuals stating a very good or good health condition (80 percent); 
therefore, a proxy using information on doctor and/or hospital visits in the past six months was 
constructed. No data was available on the expected utilization of medical services in the 
upcoming year.8 Variables for education and professional status proved also insignificant; 
however, 88 percent of the sample stated high or rather high interest in health system related 
issues. Thus the sample, being homogenous under this aspect, can be considered as ‘educated' in 
issues related to health. The high number of individuals having chosen a deductible in excess of 
the legal minimum further testifies to respondents’ familiarity with existing choice options in 
health insurance. 
Estimation results for the comprehensive model [equation (11) in section 3] are given in the 
appendix table (Table A1). They give rise to the following observations. 
Stability of attribute effects: While the signs of the constant and the six product 
attributes continue to accord with theoretical expectations, copayment, altmed, generics, and 
innovation lose statistical significance. However, they retain (or come very close to) 5 percent 
significance in at least one interaction term, with the only exception of generics. This attribute 
had the lowest WTP estimate in Table 5 already; therefore, this result is not so surprising. Status 
quo bias and all the other attributes can be said to be empirically relevant also according to this 
generalized specification. 
Preference heterogeneity: In the introductory section, it was argued that preference 
heterogeneity may be an important reason for a uniform benefit list to cause utility losses. If 
indeed marginal utilities depend on socioeconomic characteristics, this should be reflected in the 
coefficients pertaining to the respective interaction terms of equation (11). In Table A1, seven 
explanatory variables reflect such characteristics, viz. sexm, a2539, a63+, langf (french 
language), rich, poor, and hhsize. Each one is significant by itself (indicating heterogeneity with 
regard to status quo bias) or in at least one interaction term; a3539, rich, and poor even in two 
(out of seven). For example, poor people suffer greater utility loss from higher deductibles than 
middle income ones, a theoretically expected difference. In all, there is considerable evidence of 
preference heterogeneity. 
                                                 
8 As suggested and tested for Switzerland by Holly et al. (1998), supplementary insurance also seems to influence 
health care utilization. This aspect, however, is not part of the present analysis, which revolves around the mandatory 
part of  insurance.  Therefore, formation on  the presence  of supplementary coveragewas collected.  
6.3 Age-specific results 
The descriptive results of section 5.2 show that both the propensity to change the type of contract 
and health insurer decreases with age. Here, the issue is whether this translates into an age 
gradient of the status quo bias and of compensations asked to accept restrictions in coverage. 
• According to hypothesis H1 (see section 2), status quo bias is predicted to increase with 
age.  
• According to H2, WTP for more ample coverage (for avoiding restrictions, respectively) 
is predicted to increase with age. 
• According to hypothesis H3, WTP for more ample coverage (for avoiding restrictions, 
respectively) is predicted to decrease beyond age 40 or higher. 
• According to hypothesis H4, WTP for a more ample coverage and for avoiding 
restrictions decreases temporarily after retirement. 
To discriminate between H3 and H4, age-specific effects should ideally be tested for, using a 
continuous age variable along with a dummy variable for retirement to discriminate between H 3 
and H4. However, this specification resulted in severe multicollinearity. This still leaves scope 
for a partial test of H4. In the event that H4 was false, the age gradient predicted by H3 could be 
reversed after retirement age. To allow for this possibility, age groups 40-62 and 63 and above 
(a63+) were formed. Without a reversal of the age gradient, however, it will prove impossible to 
discriminate between H3 and H4. 
The age-specific WTP values shown in Table 6 are calculated by using the estimated coefficients 
from the Table A1 and multiplying them with the median values of the explanatory variables for 
the respective age-specific subsample. Median rather than mean values were used to mitigate the 
effect of outliers, whose impact may become considerable in the age subsamples. The estimated 
standard errors are computed using the Delta method. 
 
Table 6       
Mean marginal WTP for attributes for different age groups (in CHF per month) – derived from the full model 
evaluated at the age group’s median individual 
 WTP 25-39 std.err WTP 40-62 std.err. WTP 63+ std.err. 
constant 62.64 28.07 57.97 19.55 65.22 16.61 
deductible a) -0.06 0.04 -0.05 0.02 -0.03 0.01 
copayment -16.64 16.00 -30.36 12.31 -8.24 6.96 
altmed  67.51 44.88 19.95 10.60 0.77 6.38 
generics -31.77 22.00 -13.81 9.57 -8.91 6.90 
innovation -54.12 35.41 -25.50 11.57 -14.10 8.34 
a) compensation in Swiss Francs required for a CHF 1 increase in the annual deductible for the median  individual  
1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2007 exchange rates 
 
First, one notes that the compensation asked to depart from the status quo is highest for those 
individuals over 63 years of age, providing some weak support to hypothesis H1 because the 
differences are non-significant. As to the valuation of specific attributes, the differences again 
lack statistical significance in view of large estimated standard errors. (see  the large area of 
overlap between the density functions shown in  Figure 1). 
It is still interesting to note that the compensation needed for an increase in the deductible, while 
increasing with age, does not do so progressively (Table 7). Specifically, an increase from CHF 
230 (the minimum deductible in 2003), to CHF 1,500 would have to be compensated by CHF 38 
per month for the youngest age group, 50 CHF for those aged 40 to 62, and 60 CHF among the 
63+ group. This supports H2 and contradicts H3 and H4. In combination with the general 
preference for the status quo, which  is highest among those aged 63+, total compensation for 
changing the deductible from CHF 230 to CHF 1,500.would amount to a maximum of CHF 125 
per month or CHF 1,500. While this is a substantial amount, internal data of a major Swiss health 
insurer show that contracts of this type do achieve savings of this magnitude. Therefore,  it is 
conceivable that absent premium regulation, even older consumers could be won over to policies 
with rather stingy copayments. 
Table 7 
Compensation for an alternative contract with deductible of CHF 1'500 (in CHF per month)a) 
Age Considering change of contract  
Compensation for higher 
deductible 
Total 
25-39 62 38 100 
40-62 57 50 107 
63+ 65 60 125 
a) Status quo: 230 CHF  
1 CHF=0.8 US$ at 2007 exchange rates 
 
Turning to the comprehensiveness of benefits, WTP for having additional treatment methods 
from alternative medicine covered drops consistently with age. High interest in alternative 
medicine among the youngest age group is also found in several studies on the demand and 
utilization of alternative medicine (Sommer et al., 2002; Kelner and Welman, 1997; McGregor 
and Peay, 1996). 
The results for generics and innovation also point in the same direction, indicating that older 
people are willing to accept restrictions in exchange for a smaller amount of  compensation than 
younger age groups. These findings again contradict H2 but support H3 and H4. Finally, Figure 1 
provides some evidence suggesting that these orderings are not caused by outliers (this holds true 
for the other attributes as well, not shown). In panel A, the distribution of negative WTP for 
higher copayment shifts systematically towards zero with increasing age. In panel B, the same 
shift can be observed for delayed access to innovation; in addition, the distribution also becomes 
less dispersed with increasing age. 
 Figure 1 
Estimated WTP densities according to age 
 
(A) Copayment 20 rather than 10 percent (B) Delayed access to innovation 
 
Summing up, the results clearly are in accordance with H1. Status quo bias is more marked 
among the elderly, and for good economic reasons (see section 2). They only provide limited 
support for H 2, however. On the one hand, higher deductibles must be compensated more highly 
among the top age group, likely reflecting their higher risk of incurring HCE. On the other hand, 
a higher rate of copayment seems to result in smaller utility losses among the elderly. Due to high 
standard errors for the compensation demanded (see Table 6) the differences are not statistically 
significant. However, the popular belief that demand for a more ample coverage in health 
insurance generally increases with age is not confirmed. At least with respect to a more 
comprehensive benefit catalogue and an immediate access to innovations, WTP values turn out to 
be smaller for the older than for the younger age groups.  
 
7 Summary and Conclusion 
Social health insurance is heavily regulated even in countries that basically have opted for choice 
and competition. Typically, uniformity is imposed with regard to both benefits covered and cost-
sharing parameters. This may cause welfare losses to the extent that preferences differ. The 
present study seeks to establish whether such differences in preference are likely to exist in the 
case of Switzerland. Still, older consumers might fails to benefit  if social health insurers were 
permitted to write contracts with less comprehensive benefits in return for lower premiums.  
. In order to test for this possibility, this paper attempts to measure willingness-to-pay (WTP) to 
avoid   curtailments in benefits and increases in cost sharing. It reports on a Discrete Choice 
Experiment (DCE) conducted in the fall of 2003 that covers several attributes of health insurance 
contracts whose variation could contribute to added flexibility in Swiss social health insurance. 
Economic theory suggests several reasons why demand for health insurance should be related to 
age. First, any change away from the status quo amounts to an investment, the payoff to which 
decreases with reduced remaining life expectancy. Therefore, status quo bias is predicted to 
increase with age (H1). Next, demand for coverage (and hence WTP for extended benefits or 
avoiding cost sharing) may increase with age because worsening health induces variance in assets 
(H2). However, the value of the asset ‘health’ itself decreases as an individual ages, resulting in 
an opposite effect (H3). Finally, retirement status might weaken the effect considered in H2 by 
decreasing the variance of the asset ‘health’ because more time for investment in health becomes 
available, with the elasticity of substitution between medical care and own effort going to zero. 
Entering retirement status also accentuates the decrease in value of life due to a smaller future 
income. Both effects should cause e demand for comprehensive health insurance to decrease (H 
4). 
Historical choices show limited interest in alternatives to existing contracts. No less than 77 
percent of respondents did not change their insurer during five years, while 66 percent never 
changed their type of insurance contract. Among those aged 63+, both changes occur even less 
frequently. From this evidence, it is tempting to conclude that permitting choice in social health 
insurance is a non-issue to the aged. 
Indeed, WTP estimates derived from the DCE point to a marked status quo bias. On average, one 
would have to offer a premium reduction amounting to 22 percent of the national 2003 value to 
induce Swiss consumers to consider an alternative to the status quo. Moreover, annual 
deductibles exceeding CHF 600 (US$ 480) as well as a 20 percent (rather than the current 10 
percent) rate of coinsurance would have to be compensated by additional premium reductions. 
Access to alternative medicine, avoiding a drug benefit limited to generics, and access to latest 
medical innovations all command positive WTP. With the exception of generics, these findings 
are confirmed when the model is extended to let WTP depend on seven socioeconomic 
characteristics. Such a dependence is found in all cases, suggesting that preferences for health 
insurance are indeed heterogeneous.  
Concerning age in particular, compensation asked to overcome status quo bias does increase, 
although not progressively, providing evidence supporting H1. Deductibles in excess of the legal 
minimum and an increase of the rate of coinsurance from 10 to 20 percent also would have to be 
compensated more highly as a function of age. This speaks in favor of H2 and against H3 and H4 
(the two cannot be distinguished due to multicollinearity). However, WTP for attributes that 
reflect comprehensiveness of the benefit catalogue consistently tend to decrease with age, 
providing evidence against H2 and in favor of H3 and H4.  
These results should not be interpreted to mean that enlarged choice in health insurance would 
cause a majority of consumers to actually exercise it. Both past experience and a status quo bias 
evident in the DCE that is especially marked among the aged speak against such a conclusion. 
Still, the contractual cutbacks analyzed here do not require compensations by the aged that 
necessarily exceed the premium reductions that could be granted thanks to their dampening 
effects on moral hazard. In combination with status quo bias, however, some of them do exceed 
what can be offered by health insurers at present, at least for the median member of the top age 
group. This still leaves scope of addressing those among the aged who exhibit low compensation 
values. At a time when the policy debate revolves about a rationing of medical services to be 
imposed on the elderly, the finding that self-rationing through contractual choice has a chance is 
of considerable relevance. If this self-rationing takes on the form of less comprehensive benefits, 
it has appeal even among the median member of the top age group in Switzerland. If it takes on 
the form of increased cost sharing, the cost savings may still result in premium reductions that are 
sufficient to win over at least to some even of the top age group.  
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Table A1      
Random-effects probit estimation results (full model) 
 exp. sign coefficient std.err.  z-value 
constant 0 -0.87395 0.23906 *** -3.66 
deductible - -0.00085 0.00012 *** -6.87 
deductible2 +/- 1.12e-07 0.00000 *** 3.53 
copayment - -0.33744 0.18286 * -1.85 
altmed a) + 0.28399 0.18338  1.55 
generics - -0.07629 0.17453  -0.44 
innovation - -0.00488 0.21739  -0.02 
premium - -0.01508 0.00273 *** -5.53 
a2539*deduct  6.75e-05 6.81e-05  0.99 
a2539*deduct2  -1.15e-08 1.83e-08  -0.63 
a2539*copay  -0.03366 0.09941  -0.34 
a2539*altmed   0.12122 0.09702  1.25 
a2539*generics   -0.01993 0.09753  -0.20 
a2539*innov.   -0.23113 0.11262 ** -2.05 
a2539*premium   -0.00322 0.00141 ** -2.29 
a63+*deduct   0.00020 0.00010 ** 1.93 
a63+*deduct2  -1.44e-08 2.55e-08  -0.56 
a63+*copay  0.26306 0.13380 ** 1.97 
a63+*altmed  -0.23687 0.13096 * -1.81 
a63+*generics   0.03280 0.13152  0.25 
a63+*innov.  0.10810 0.14908  0.73 
a63+*premium   0.00543 0.00183 ** 2.97 
sexm*deduct   0.00015 6.41e-05 *** 2.34 
sexm*deduct   -2.88e-08 1.69e-08 * -1.71 
sexm*copay   0.08336 0.09139  0.91 
sexm*altmed  -0.16156 0.08891 * -1.82 
sexm*generics   -0.08908 0.08939  -1.00 
sexm*innov.  0.04951 0.10253  0.48 
sexm*premium   0.00187 0.00128  1.46 
langf*deduct  2.89e-05 7.07e-05  0.41 
langf*deduct2   -1.38e-08 1.91e-08  -0.72 
langf*copay   0.13053 0.10135  1.29 
Table A1 continued…      
…Table A1 continued      
langf*altmed   -0.06019 0.09856  -0.61 
langf*generics   -0.07649 0.09841  -0.78 
langf*innov.  0.24711 0.11308 ** 2.19 
langf*premium   0.00215 0.00141  1.53 
rich*deduct  + 0.00028 9.01e-05 *** 3.07 
rich*deduct2  +/- -7.42e-08 2.65e-08 *** -2.79 
rich*copay + -0.02325 0.09885  -0.24 
rich*altmed  + 0.18744 0.10506 * 1.78 
rich*generics  + 0.09924 0.10221  0.97 
rich*innov.  + 0.21166 0.11320 * 1.87 
rich*premium  + 0.00131 0.00148  0.88 
poor*deduct  - -0.00027 0.00011 *** -2.54 
poor*deduct2 +/- 6.45e-08 2.76e-08 ** 2.34 
poor*copay - -0.18372 0.14008  -1.31 
poor*altmed  - 0.00578 0.13762  0.04 
poor*generics - -0.06435 0.13977  -0.46 
poor*innov. - 0.06104 0.16089  0.38 
poor*premium - 0.00319 0.00198  1.62 
hh*deduct  - 4.55e-05 2.84e-05  1.60 
hh*deduct2 +/- -1.63e-08 7.51e-09 ** -2.16 
hh*copay - -0.01334 0.04310  -0.31 
hh*altmed  0.06510 0.04235  1.54 
hh*generics   -0.00556 0.04229  -0.13 
hh*innov.   -0.06685 0.04830  -1.38 
hh*premium  - -0.00035 0.00061  -0.58 
notreat*deduct  + 8.46e-05 6.50e-05  1.30 
notreat*deduct2 +/- -7.73e-09 1.71e-08  -0.45 
notreat*copay + 0.29779 0.09277 *** 3.21 
notreat*altmed   0.16860 0.09023 * 1.87 
notreat*generics   -0.09656 0.09067  -1.06 
notreat*innov.   0.11189 0.10367  1.08 
notreat*premium   -0.00080 0.00130  -0.62 
prem_pd*deduct  - -3.12e-07 2.81e-07  -1.11 
prem_pd *deduct2 -/+ 1.39e-11 7.59e-11  0.18 
prem_pd *copay - -0.00022 0.00039  -0.56 
Table A1 continued…      
…Table A1 continued      
prem_pd *altmed  - -0.00065 0.00039 * -1.65 
prem_pd *generics - -0.00046 0.00033  -1.37 
prem_pd *innov.  - -0.00094 0.00052 * -1.80 
prem_pd *premium  - -3.61e-06 6.29e-06  -0.57 
a2539  0 0.13103 0.13352  0.98 
a63+ 0 -0.46353 0.17655 *** -2.63 
sexm  0 -0.05830 0.13744  -0.42  
languagef 0 -0.11770 0.15083  -0.78 
rich  0 -0.10998 0.13653  -0.81 
poor  0 0.05966 0.20956  0.28 
hhsize  0 0.00957 0.05781  0.17 
notreatment  0 -0.18403 0.12322  -1.49 
prem_pd 0 0.00068 0.00043  1.57 
constant 0 -0.87395 0.23906 *** -3.66 
σ=0.91029, ρ=0.45314     
Log likelihood: -2964.4978     
n=9334     
a) expanded coverage of alternative medicine (status quo=no inclusion) 
*** (**,*) significant at the 1 (5, 10) percent level 
0: predicted to be insignificant in the random utility model 
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